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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper we study store brand demand behavior by examining a panel of household 
level and store-level data in five stores located in a competing market area.  We seek to 
address three fundamental questions from this data.  First, is there a link between store 
loyalty and brand loyalty?  Second, does store loyalty raise store brand choice 
probabilities?  Third, if a store brand is introduced into a category, what happens to the 
retail prices of the incumbent brands in the category?  We find that store loyalty is 
negatively associated with brand loyalty, and that store loyalty increases the likelihood of 
a store brand purchase in a given category.  We find mixed evidence on how the retailer 
changes prices of incumbent brands when it introduces a store brand to the category.  
Category level market structure measures are used to help identify under what conditions 
the category prices fall or rise.  A number of robustness checks are used to help validate 
our findings.   
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 1. Introduction 
 
 
A store brand can be a strategic tool used by retailers to generate greater market power in 
a category vis-à-vis its channel partners (e.g. Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer 2000, 
Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song, 2002).  The presence of a store brand can also have an 
effect on the ability for the store to compete against rival stores.  How does a retailer 
make money from the store brand?  Who buys the store brand?  What happens to prices 
of other brands in a category when the retailer adopts a store brand in a category?  The 
goal of this research is to provide some empirical results that can help answer these 
questions, and to suggest some new perspectives on why retailers may carry store brands, 
based on the profits they generate from selected groups of customers.   
 
In this paper we study how a retailer can make money by introducing a store brand.  In 
other words, we want to show that store brands can be used to attract customers, to make 
more marketing profits (Chen, Hess, Wilcox and Zhang, 1999) from attracted customers, 
or to generate greater marketing profits from loyal customers.  We proceed with this 
study by asking three key questions.  First, what is the association between store loyalty 
and brand loyalty?  That is, does strong store loyalty behavior translate into brand loyalty 
behavior?  If store loyal customers tend not to be brand loyal, then there may be more 
scope for store brands to compete within stores, against these national brands.  Second, 
how does store loyalty affect the likelihood of individual shoppers to purchase the store 
brand?  If store loyalty behavior positively affects the likelihood of a store brand 
purchase, then retailers can potentially exploit this behavior to obtain higher margins on 
store brand sales to store loyal customers. The third question we ask involves the 
introduction of new store brands to the retailer’s categories.  Given a new national brand 
enters the category, typically the retailer will lower prices, because, ceteris paribus, as the 
market is now shared among more brands, more intense price competition will be 
present.  However, how do retailers adjust the prices of these national brand incumbents 
if a retailer adds a store brand?  Although a new store brand may have the impact of 
raising the level of competition within the category (with lower national brand prices), it 
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may also be able to raise prices of incumbent national brands, if the retailer positions the 
store brand closer to a price sensitive segment, and therefore lowers the retailer’s need to 
serve this segment with the national brands.    
 
Specifically, our interest in these questions arises from the following.  If we find that less 
store loyal customers tend to be more brand loyal, and that store loyal customers are more 
inclined to purchase private label or store brands (the first two questions above), then in 
some categories, the retailer may be better off increasing the prices of the national brands 
when introducing a store brand.  In this way, if the store is able to attract store switchers 
via traffic builder products in key categories, the brand loyalty of these store switchers 
will result in their purchases of higher priced national brands leading to higher margins 
for the retailer from these store switchers. Coupled with the store loyals’ purchases of 
store brands that yield higher margins, the store may be able to make more money from 
its customer pool. 
 
These questions are addressed in our empirical analysis using sales and panel data on 104 
categories for five competing retailers in a localized geographic region in a major US 
City.  For these data, we construct measures of brand loyalty, store loyalty and store 
brand purchases.  We then identify a set of “new brands” in the data, and directly 
examine how the incumbent brands’ prices change after the entry of a national brand, 
versus a store brand.  We find that a) households who are store loyal tend to be less brand 
loyal; b) store loyal customers are more likely to purchase the store brand than less loyal 
customers; c) the impact of a store brand entrant on retail prices of incumbent national 
brands varies considerably across categories.  Given this last finding, we further explored 
the category specific factors (such as the Herfindahl for brands in the category, the 
number of competitors and number of brands, and the total price dispersion) that may 
account for this variability.   The key insight here is that any category-specific increase in 
prices after the entry of a store brand, tends to be heavily mitigated by the level of market 
power in a category (the Herfindahl index) and by the number of manufacturers present 
in that category.  We use a number of robustness checks to validate our findings.  Our last 
section also highlights several limitations.   
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 The contribution of this paper is a set of substantive findings useful in understanding why 
retailers would want store brands in their assortment.  An understanding of what are the 
benefits of store brands, either in building store attractiveness vis-à-vis a rival store, or in 
improving the overall assortment profitability, can guide retailers in their choice whether 
to introduce store brands, and the types of categories they should introduce store brands. 
 
2. Background 
 
Consumer behavior, store loyalty and store brand purchases.  Who buys store 
brands?  Past empirical results have highlighted individual customer characteristics 
(demographics) that lead to store brand purchases (e.g. Bellizzi, Hamilton, Krueckeberg 
and Martin 1981, Szymanski and Busch 1987, or see Dhar and Hoch, 1997), or generate 
loyalty for brands and or stores.   For example, Dhar and Hoch (1997) show that store 
brand categories located in demographics characterized by “less wealthy and more 
elderly” (p208) households tend to be more successful.  Bellizzi et al. could not discern 
any difference in self-reported measures of several consumer behavioral variables 
(including store loyalty, use of coupons and interest in promotional sales and specials).  
There is some evidence that price sensitive customers are more likely to purchase such 
store brands.  For example, Hoch (1996) reports that in categories with higher overall 
price sensitivities, store brand penetration tends to be higher.  However, in the same study 
no link was found between store-level price sensitivity and category price sensitivity. 
 
Links between behavioral measures and store brand purchase propensities have also been 
studied.  For instance, Hoch (1996) show that store-level price sensitivity is negatively 
related to private label market share.  Rao (1969) shows evidence that store loyalty is 
positively related to the proportion that store brands are purchased for coffee.  In a recent 
article, Corstjens and Lal (2000) show that the store switching costs (therefore store 
loyalty) can be increased with the use of a store brand strategy.  Their result depends on 
the presence of a sufficiently high quality store brand and sufficiently large segment of 
customers that buy the national brand.  Although these studies on store brand buyer 
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behavior point toward a generalized positive association between store brand purchase 
likelihood and store loyalty, the store-loyalty/store brand purchase hypothesis remains to 
be tested across an array of categories and stores.   
 
Store brands’ effect on category retail pricing.  How does the retailer change the 
prices of the national brands in a category where a store brand is introduced?  It is not 
clear, from theory, as to what will happen to retail prices if a national brand, or a store 
brand, enters the category.  The outcome depends on the net result of multiple supply and 
demand side interactions.  From the supply side, first, the nature of the interactions 
among manufacturers can change.  Second, the way in which the retailer interacts with 
the manufacturers can be affected (e.g. see Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song, 2002), 
resulting in different wholesale prices.  Third, the way in which the retailer interacts with 
competing retailers can change.  From the demand side, to the extent that the retailer 
positions the store brands close to one or more of the national brands (see Scott-Morton 
and Zettelmeyer 2001 and Sayman, Hoch and Raju 2000) the introduction of these brands 
can affect the willingness to pay for national brands.   
 
If we are aiming to understand what will happen to category pricing after a store brand 
entry, it is also worthwhile reviewing what is know about determinants and measures of 
store brand success.   Hoch and Banerji (1993) found that store brands tend to perform 
better in larger categories, with high gross margins, and where quality levels (of the 
private labels) are high.  Store brands tend to perform poorly in categories with higher 
competition and more intense branding activity is present (national advertising).  
Strategies of the retailer may also improve store brand performance (Dhar and Hoch 
1997), including the EDLP pricing strategies in “lower quality” categories, the level of 
promotional support.  Dhar and Hoch (1997) also suggest that national brands tend to 
build traffic, through breadth and depth of assortment, and promotional pricing strategies, 
mechanisms that were found in direct conflict to retailers’ store brand program. 
 
Recent research has addressed the issue of how a store brand should be positioned vis-à-
vis the national brands, primarily from the retailer’s perspective (see papers by Scott-
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Morton and Zettelmeyer 2001, and Sayman, Hoch and Raju 2001).  Interestingly, both 
studies suggest that, to maximize category-level profits, the retailer’s optimal strategy is 
to position close to a leading national brand, a finding supported by empirical analyses, 
which demonstrate that across categories, many store brands imitate the national brands.  
Under such conditions, although the retailer enjoys greater profits from the high margins 
on store brands, it seems likely that there be a downward pressure on incumbent national 
brand retail prices if the store brand were introduced.   
 
Is there any reason to expect incumbent national brand retail prices to rise after the entry 
of a store brand?  One possibility is suggested by Dunne and Narasimhan (1999), based 
on the store brand introduction used to “shield” national brands from price competition, 
where the store brand is used to capture the price sensitive customers.  However, as some 
authors point out, the store brands are not necessarily targeted only at the price-sensitive 
customers (Hoch and Banerji 1993), and that a major factor in the retailer’s success of the 
store brand program is that the store brand is of comparable quality to national brands. 
 
Empirical evidence has some mixed results.  For example, Chintagunta, Bonfrer and 
Song (2002) tested the impact of a store brand entry on two categories, and found that, 
for the oats category, both retail and wholesale prices decreased after the entry of the 
store brand.  However, for the refrigerated pasta category they observe that some of the 
retail prices increase after the entry of the store brand.  Moreover, with respect to the 
store brand, the impact on prices of the national brand can be affected after introduction 
of the store brand, depending on how closely the new store brand is positioned to the one 
or more of the national brands (Sayman, Hoch and Raju, 2001).   
 
To help understand customer and retailer behavior toward store brands, we require 
further empirical evidence to understand the linkage between store loyalty and within-
store brand loyalty, and how store loyalty relates to store brand purchase likelihood.  We 
also would like to be able to understand how, at a store-level, category-pricing behavior 
is affected by store brand entry.   In the next section, we discuss the methodology used to 
address these issues. 
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3. Methodology 
 
Testing household store loyalty, brand loyalty and store brand incidence 
A probit model was specified to model the conditional likelihood that a household h, will 
buy a store brand (versus buying a national brand in that category) in category c of store s 
in week t ( ( )xΦ  is a standard normal cdf): 
  (1) =Prob ( 1| store ,SB presence in category c)= ( )sbhcst ht hsctP SB s µ= = Φ
where hsctµ is the deterministic component of indirect utility of the purchase of store 
brand, relative to the purchase of a national brand (i.e. indirect utility of the national 
brand is set to zero).  The store brand purchase is conditional on the presence of a store 
brand in the category, and conditional on the household visiting that category on a given 
purchase occasion.  In our sample we have observations of panelists’ brand purchases for 
each category and store.  Indirect utility for a store brand purchase, relative to a national 
brand purchase, is specified using the linear additive function: 
0 1 2 3
sb
sct
hsct s hst hc h
sct
pI C SL
p
µ α α β β β= + + + +  
where 0α  is an overall intercept parameter; the indicator variable hstI  indicates whether 
panelist h visited store s at time t (irrespective of whether the household purchased in 
category c or not). This store-level fixed effect is included to capture unobservable 
phenomena such as different retailers’ branding efforts of the store brands, or the 
pervasiveness of the store brands in the focal store.  The variable C  is a share-based 
value that measures how much of their budget (the total amount spent across all stores 
and all weeks) that household h spent on category c.  The category expenditure share 
variable is time-invariant; we calculated it using all the data available in the time series 
for that panelist, and across all stores.  That is, regardless of the store visited, C  
captures the total share of wallet allocated to category c.  The term 
hc
hc
sb
sct
sct
p
p
 is a relative price 
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metric used to measure the amount that must be paid for the store brand, relative to 
national brands in the same category.  The term sbsctp  is the average store brand price paid 
in store s, category c, and week t, and the denominator sctp is the average price of all 
national brands in store s, category c and week t. 
 
The term,  is a store loyalty variable – a measure of how much the household 
switches among stores, versus purchases at just one store each week.  It is important to 
note that this store loyalty variable is calculated 
hSL
across the stores, and based on trip-level 
data.  The trip-level data is a superset of the panel data (see data section for details).  For 
the loyalty variable, we adopt a similar approach as that of Bucklin and Lattin (1992), 
also used by Bell, Ho and Tang (1998).  Store loyalty is based on the number of trips to 
each store, relative to the number of trips made to all stores.  Loyalty by household h, to 
store s is measured using: 
 1/
1
hs
hs
h
nL
N
S+= +  (2) 
where  is the number of trips made by household h at store s, S is the total number of 
stores the household can potentially shop at, and  is the total number of shopping trips 
made by household h.  The number of stores remains fixed over our observation series 
(S=5).  Second, to compute a measure of the household’s overall loyalty 
hsn
hN
across the stores, 
we use the Herfindahl index1: 
 2
1
S
h h
s
SL L
=
= s∑  
                                                 
1 This measure may be criticized because as the number of stores (S) increases, for a given ( ), the 
store loyalty will decrease.  However, across our sample we keep S fixed.  We also explored an alternative 
formulation of store loyalty, based on expenditure shares.  In constructing the loyalty variable, for each 
household, across all of the weeks, we sum basket-level expenditures per store, and divide by the total 
expenditures across all stores ( ) to obtain the store-specific (time invariant) expenditure shares, then 
we sum the square of each household’s store loyalty across the S stores: 
,hs hn N
hSE
2
1
hS
hs
h
s hS
ESL
E=
 =   ∑  
The direction of results did not change when we used this measure.  For consistency with the next section, 
we adopt the trip-incidence based loyalty variable.   
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Store loyalty and brand loyalty 
We are also interested in testing the association between brand loyalty and a household’s 
loyalty to a particular store.  The store loyalty metric is calculated for each store-
household pair.  Thus, loyalty for store s measures the propensity for the household to 
shop at s.  Do people who exhibit store loyalty behavior also exhibit brand loyalty in that 
store?  To test this idea, we need a measure of store-specific brand loyalty.  That is, 
within each store, what is that household’s brand loyalty behavior?  Note that we are 
interested in store-specific brand loyalty behavior.  For example, it may be possible that 
someone is brand loyal in the EDLP store, but not brand loyal in the HILO store.  We do 
want to allow customers to exhibit this behavior.  Our implications are based on a 
customer being brand loyal at a given store, even if that customer is not brand loyal at 
another store. 
 
In this study, brand loyalty is measured using the expenditure share of the household’s 
favorite brand within each category, averaged across the total number of categories 
bought by that household within that store.  This measure is across all shopping trips but 
within stores.  That is we sum the total amount spent on the favorite brand and divide this 
by the total amount spent on the category: 
 
1
1 h bC cjhs
hs b
chs chs
E
BL
C E=
= ∑  (3) 
where  is the dollar expenditure on the favorite brand (j) of household h, in category 
c, store s and  is the total amount spent by household h, in category c, store s.  The 
average value above is based on the total number of categories the household purchased 
in store s, C . 
b
cjhsE
b
chsE
hs
 
 
To test the validity of this brand loyalty construct, we develop another measure of store-
specific brand loyalty, based on the number of distinct brands bought, across shopping 
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trips, relative to the number of brands available in the store per category.  This cross-
category measure of brand loyalty for household h, store s is defined as: 
 
1
1 hsC bnb hcs
hs b
chs cs
nBL
C N=
 =  ∑   (4) 
where  represents the number of distinct brands purchased by household h in category 
c across all shopping trips, and is the total number of distinct brands that were 
available in category c, store s.  We use the scaling factor 
b
hcsn
b
csN
1
hsC
 to avoid shoppers with 
very broad baskets (i.e. shoppers who purchase many different products), having 
artificially high loyalty through the summation alone.  In calculating (4), we also dropped 
observations for categories where only one brand was available, to avoid biasing the 
brand loyalty measure where no other choice was available within the category. 
 
The Model for Testing Price Effects 
To test how the retailer will adjust incumbent brands prices following the entry of either a 
national brand or a store brand, we use a direct test of the change in retail prices of these 
incumbent brands.  We define a time-series for the category level price index (each with 
T observations) and regress this onto various covariates, including an event-style 
indicator variable to measure the impact of the entry of new brands on average category 
prices.  The methodology here is adapted from a specification used by Hausman and 
Leonard (2002) to test the competitive effects of entry of the Kleenex bathroom tissue 
brand on individual brands’ prices in the toilet tissue category.   
 
The equation to test the effect of the entry on the prices of the rest of the category (the 
incumbents’ average price) is specified as the following function: 
 [ , )1 2log sj j sjsct sc sct sct sjctp I I
τ τ τα δ δ= + + +ε  (5) 
 
where log sctp is the log of price of the incumbent (i.e. excluding the entering brand, both 
before and after the entry of the brand) brands in category c, at time t, for store s.  There 
are two indicator variables in (5).  The first is switched to “1” when the entering brand j 
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enters store s at time sjt τ= .  The new brand j enters the market at time sjt τ= .  The 
second indicator variable, [ , )j sjtcsI
τ τ   is the interim period, the time between the launch of the 
new brand in the market (i.e. any of the five stores) and the time it is launched in store s.  
The set [ , )j sjτ τ  (of integers for t), represents this time span.  We use this since there may 
be some adjustment of the prices by stores prior to the entry of the new brand to the store, 
but after the entry of the brand to the market.   
1xp( )δ −
 
To interpret the effect of the national or store brand entry, the value e 1 equals the 
percentage change in price following the entry of the brand.  Our dependent variable is a 
category level price index time series, for the incumbent brands.  The way we construct 
this variable is to count the total category volume sold, and divide this by the total dollar 
sales for the category, by week and by store.  We only include the incumbent brands’ 
prices, both before and after the entry of each brand.  One consequence of the 
construction of this index is that multiple entering brands do not become part of the set of 
incumbent brands.  However, our primary focus of interest is the impact on a set of stable 
brands, not any of the entering brands.   
 
4. Data 
 
The data available for this study consists of store level sales data and pricing information 
for 104 weeks, in 5 stores, and for 104 product categories.   Among the five stores, two 
used the Every Day Low Pricing strategy (EDLP), whereas three of the stores used the 
HILO pricing strategy.  Under the EDLP format, the retailer maintains a low average 
pricing across all categories, with fewer deep discounts, whereas under the HILO 
strategy, the retailer maintains a higher average set of prices, with steeper discounts on 
selected items (for details see Hoch, Drèze and Purk 1994, or Bell and Lattin 1998).  The 
data available for this set of stores consists of both household level, and store level 
purchase observations.  We also have available trip level data, which is a superset of the 
panel data (the panel data are observations at the UPC level).    
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 To study the retailer’s category pricing following new brand entries, we require a 
procedure for identifying new brands.   Appendix A describes this procedure in more 
detail.  Based on the selection procedure, across the five stores, we study a set of 723 new 
brand introductions, including national and store brands.  Of these, 311 are new brand 
introductions across all the stores.  There was considerable activity in the introduction of 
store brands in this sample.  A total of 58 of the brand introductions were store brands, 
launched into a total of 38 distinct categories across the stores.   
 
5. Results 
 
Descriptive statistics 
We start by highlighting the nature of store brand sales and presence across categories 
and stores.   Many of these data are in Table 1.  There are three panels.  We discuss with 
reference to each of these panels in turn.  Our observations are: 
1. Store brand presence. Of the 104 categories across the five stores in this pod, 64 
(62%) had store brand presence at some point (could be anytime or in any store).  
Panel A of Table 1 presents the store brand sales across the stores in the pod.  
This shows that across the 5 stores, there was a store brand presence for almost 
every category that accounted for any sales (see the last column).  Even though 
only 62% of the categories had store brand presence, these 64 categories account 
for more than 90% of sales overall. 
2. Store brand presence within each store.  Panel B shows the category sales and the 
store brand sales for each store, given they had the store brand (somewhere in the 
two years) in the category.  The last column shows the percent of categories that 
contained a store brand for that store.  The second to last column presents the 
dollar sales accounted for by the categories that contained store brands.  Although 
store brand sales are, on average, low, the diffusion is very high, ranging from just 
under 50% to over 92% of categories.  This suggests that retailers have tried to 
put a store brand in the majority of their important categories, individually, and 
most of the categories, collectively.   
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3. Store brand purchases by households in the panel (N=548).  Panel C of Table 1 
lists the average store brand expenditure shares by households in the panel.  
Various conditional shares are provided.  The first column is the percent spent on 
store brand based on overall basket size (given we have data available for the 
category, N=104 categories).  The second column lists the same market share but 
based only on total dollar sales in those categories for which store brand was 
available in that store.  The final column is the store brand expenditure share 
based on the categories for which the store brand was bought on that purchase 
occasion.  If this is close to one, then across the categories, the store brand is 
usually the only brand bought in that category, and may thereby be highly 
substitutable with the national brands.  If this is less than one, then across the 
categories, then on average the store brand is bought alongside national brands.  
We see that store E2 had over 16% (=1-0.838) of the store brand sales 
accompanied by national brand purchases.  It is interesting to see that both EDLP 
stores (E1,E2) had less overall dollar sales in store brands than store H1, but they 
both have lower share store brand expenditure.   
 
----------------------------- 
Table 1 here 
----------------------------- 
 
Further to panel B of Table 1, we examined the number and value of the purchase 
occasions where, within each category, the national brand was bought at the same time a 
store brand was bought.  We also calculated the total value of these purchase incidences, 
and the percentage share for the store brand purchased at every purchase occasion.  The 
total amount spent by households on all the categories is $572,079.  The amount spent on 
store brands across stores, by the same households is $20,655 (about 3.6% of purchases).  
Given these store brand purchases, a total of $1,461 (for around 11% of the store brand 
purchase occasions) was in addition to purchases of a national brand on the same 
purchase occasion.  In these cases the national brand expenditure was more than the store 
brand expenditure, on average.   These numbers indicate that, within a category, if the 
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store brand is purchased, in most cases it is the only brand purchased.  However, there are 
some purchase occasions where households purchased both store brand and national 
brands within the same category. 
----------------------------- 
Figure 1 here 
----------------------------- 
How many people buy store brands?  See Figure 1 for the histogram of the log(store 
brand share) by household.  We took the log for illustration purposes, since the 
distribution of these shares are negative exponential with a lower bound of zero, and the 
original histogram would place most of the households in the first two bars.  The store 
brand expenditure shares are conditional on the category having a store brand, at least in 
one of the stores, and also conditional on this store brand share being greater than zero 
(i.e. we do not consider households who never buy a store brand). What is quite 
interesting is that most people have tried a store brand in at least one category, about 
502/548= 92% of households have spent at least some of their budget on the store brand 
at some point on at least one category.   
 
Probit model estimation results 
The results for the probit estimation are in Table 2, including the parameter estimates and 
the relevant standard errors.  All the variables in the model are statistically significant, 
except for the fixed effect variable for the second HILO (H2) store, which is very close to 
zero, and negative.  The probability of store brand purchase is conditional on visiting a 
store, and shopping in a category with a store brand presence. 
----------------------------- 
Table 2 here 
----------------------------- 
 
The intercepts represent the relative indirect utility (overall) that the store brand has 
relative to the national brand for a given store.  For identification purposes, we omitted 
the fixed effect of the third HILO store, so all the fixed indirect utility components should 
be read as relative to store H3.  The category share variable, used to account for the 
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importance of the category to that household (across stores), is negative, and statistically 
significant, suggesting that the more important the category in terms of budget share, the 
less likely a store brand purchase will be made in that category.  The store loyalty 
variable is positive, and statistically significant for both store pairs.  This indicates that 
higher store loyalty is associated with higher store brand purchase likelihood.  
 
The elasticities are listed below the parameter estimates, but only for the “loyalty” 
variable.  From the elasticity, we want to know how much a percentage change in the 
loyalty variable will result in a percentage change in the probability of purchasing the 
store brand.  The loyalty elasticity is 0.24.  This elasticity is not substantial; a 10% 
increase from the mean in loyalty for store pair (E1,E2) will yield only a 2.4% change in 
purchase probability of store brand.  It will be more substantial if one considers a 
household with very switching likelihood - e.g. someone with loyalty value around 20-
30%, this is a 50% drop in loyalty from the mean point, and we would predict a 12% 
decrease in purchase probability of store brands.  Nevertheless the results do indicate that 
the more loyal customers tend to have higher conditional likelihood of purchasing the 
store brands.   
 
The association between brand loyalty and store loyalty 
To address the issue if there is a positive or negative association between brand loyalty 
and store loyalty, we examined the store loyalty (from equation (2)) versus the brand 
loyalty as measured across categories using equation (3).  A formal test of the strength of 
the association between the two metrics is performed with the use of the Pearson 
correlation statistic.  The partial correlation matrix is presented in Table 3.  The diagonals 
represent the correlations between store loyalty for the focal store, versus brand loyalty 
within that same store.  The correlations give a strong indication that these store loyalty 
and brand loyalty metrics are correlated.  All the diagonal correlation estimates ( ρ ) are 
statistically significant, and all are negative, suggesting that higher store loyalty is 
typically associated with lower brand loyalty within that store.  As a corollary to this 
finding, all the off diagonals are positive which implies that store loyalty at one store is 
positively associated with the brand loyalty of a competing store.   
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 We cross-validate these results by using a different measure of brand loyalty.  This 
measure, from equation (4), is based on the average number of distinct brands purchased 
by panelist h, relative to the number of available per store.  The results are not shown 
here, but they show the similar negative (even stronger, with most over –0.8, excepting 
store H2) correlations as the brand loyalty construct. 
 
-----------------------------  
Table 3 here 
----------------------------- 
 
Another issue about the measure used for store-specific brand loyalty, is that customers 
may possess intrinsic brand loyalty, invariant across stores.  This is consistent with the 
idea that customer switch stores, primarily to purchase, for example, Tide laundry 
detergent.  In response to this concern about loyalty being a household-specific 
phenomenon, an additional test of the correlation of store loyalty and brand loyalty 
(across stores) was performed.  For store loyalty, we used the metric in equation (2).   
The weighted Herfindahl index for brand loyalty is where ( 2
1
hS
hs
s
BL
=
∑ ) hsBL is as defined in 
(3), and is between 0 and 1 for each store.  If this value is close to one, then the 
household tends to be loyal, on average, across all categories within store s.  The problem 
with this measure, is that by shopping at a larger number of stores, a given household’s 
brand loyalty measure is going to be larger simply because of the number of stores visited.  
To adjust for this, we use a household specific weight based on the number of stores 
visited by that household .  This weighted measure is hS ( hsBL )2
1
1 hS
shS =
∑ . Regardless of the 
measure used, both results indicate a statistically significant negative correlation across 
the store-invariant measures of brand and store loyalty.  For the non-weighted Herfindahl, 
the correlation between store loyalty and brand loyalty, overall was –0.49 (p<0.001) and 
for the weighted Herfindahl, this was negative and statistically significant with a 
correlation of  -0.10 (p<0.03). 
 17
 Testing the effect of entry on incumbents’ prices 
We now turn to the results for how the entrants affect incumbents’ prices across the 
category.  We present the results of the direct effect on (log) category prices, in Table 4.  
The left half of the table presents the estimation results for the impact on incumbents’ 
prices of a store brand entering the market.  The right hand side presents the same results, 
but for the national brand entrant. 
----------------------------- 
Table 4 here 
----------------------------- 
 
The results indicate that, for the store brand entry, on average, the incumbents’ prices rise 
by 14.5% ( ).  When a national brand enters the market, the price change is 
negative ( ).   Both results are statistically significant.  The rows 
beginning with a store code (E2,H1,H2,H3) were the store level fixed effects.  They 
control for variations in pricing due to store specific conditions.   They are normalized 
based on the first EDLP store, for both models.   
0.13574sbδ =
0.04095nbδ = − 4.0%⇒−
 
The next variable is the impact of the “interim” price indicator.  This is the impact on 
prices for stores where the new brand had not yet entered, but was launched in one of the 
competitive stores.  For the store brand entry, this, of course is not going to be applicable 
because for most stores the store brand should only be launched in that store.  However, 
two of the stores (H2,H3) are of the same chain, so there is a possibility of some phased 
launch of the store brand there.  The data only observed one such instance, affecting 11 
weeks of data, where a store brand of corn chips was introduced in store H2, after store 
H3.  For the national brand, we see that the interim price change is statistically significant 
and of the same sign as that of the actual launch of the new brand for that store.  More 
importantly, it adds another 3.4% to the price change, making the total category price 
decrease of about 7.5%, attributable to the national brand, compared with a 14.1% 
increase in the retail category prices stemming from the entry of the store brand.   
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Use of the category specific metric.  A potential criticism of the above results is the 
metric we used to measure the category level retail prices of the incumbents.  An 
argument could be developed that the (implicit) share-weighted measure of category 
retail prices may be affected by the rate of substitution between the new entering brand 
(e.g. the store brand) and some subset of brands in the category.  For example, after the 
entry of a store brand, it may be that many there is some substitution away from either the 
small brand, or from the brand it is most closely positioned to, which artificially 
generates the effect of changing prices, because the weight changes post-entry. 
 
To check whether this is affecting our results, we re-run the analysis based on brand 
level, instead of category level, models.  To do this, we first selected a subset of brands 
such that these brands were “stable, always available” for each store.  That is, we need to 
observe a full time series of data for these brands.  We selected both the smallest and the 
largest brands for our analysis.  We deleted data for any category where only one 
incumbent brand exists in the category.  This is to allow for a comparison across 
oligopoly markets only.  Using the largest brand as a dependent variable yields the 
estimate for large1δ = -0.155 (s.e. = 0.018) given a national brand entry and large1δ =0.359 
(s.e. = 0.040) given a store brand entry.  The same analysis for the smallest national brand 
as a dependent variable, yields estimates of =0.445 (0.041) given a store brand entry 
and = -0.140 (s.e. = 0.020) for national brand entry.  These results suggest that the 
percentage change in prices following a store brand entry is lower for the leading national 
brand than for the smallest national brand.   Thus, the largest incumbent brands are less 
affected by the store brand entry than are the smallest brands. 
small
1δ
small
1δ
 
 
The impact of category fixed effects on the results is also of some concern in interpreting 
these results.  Although, on average, we find that the retailer lowers the incumbent prices 
subsequent to a national brand entry, but raises incumbent prices after a store brand entry, 
any approach we use that attempts to directly include these fixed effects tends to dilute 
this finding.  The specification without category fixed effects may yield incorrect 
inference, because the effect we are measuring may be simply due to the different price 
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levels of the various categories involved.  That is, we may expect that a bigger impact 
would exist for categories with higher mean category price levels.  To test whether this is 
indeed the case, we test the correlation between the 1δ  parameters estimated at the 
category level, with the mean price levels of these categories.  We run this test for both 
store and national brand entry models.  In both specifications we find that this correlation 
is very low – for national brand entry, the correlation is 0.03, and for store brand entry the 
correlation is around 0.16, neither is statistically different from zero. 
 
In our analysis, we ignored category fixed effects, since we wanted to measure on 
average, across categories, whether and how the retailer would adjust retail prices after 
the entry of an individual national or store brand.  However, it is important to know if this 
effect would exist if we include the category-level fixed effects.  To do this, we adopted 
two approaches.  The first approach is to run the same model as (5), but then category by 
category.  In the interest of brevity, we do not list all the results for these categories, 
(these are available from the authors).  Instead, we plot the percentage change in prices 
for each category, in Figure 2 .  Note that for many of the categories, there were multiple 
national brand entries.  Figure 2 graphically presents the percentage change in price for 
each category, ranked by the magnitude from the lowest to the highest impact on 
category prices.  This shows that 35 categories witnessed store brand entry, across the 5 
stores.  Of the 35, 16 (46%) saw the category prices fall, whereas for the national brands, 
for 31 out of 65 categories (48%) the category prices fell.  So we see that the positive 
(negative) effect of store brand (national brand) entry on retail prices is specific to each 
category.   
----------------------------- 
Figure 2  here 
----------------------------- 
The second approach normalizes the dependent variable (incumbent prices) using the 
relative retail price of incumbents at the time of entry of the new brand.  This relative 
price is the weighted average of the retail prices of all incumbent brands in the category 
prior to the date of entry (with volume-based weights).  This approach is similar to using 
category fixed effects, except that here we only make use of the information up to the 
 20
point of entry for each brand.  Again, the output from this analysis is quite lengthy and 
not shown here.  However, based on the 1δ  parameters, after controlling for the store 
level fixed effects, we see a similar result as without the normalization: the 1δ  parameter 
for the store brand is 0.117 (s.e.=0.02), and for the national brand entry  1δ =-0.019 (s.e. = 
0.008).  Both estimates are statistically significantly different from zero. 
 
6. Discussion 
The results highlight three key phenomena. First, we demonstrate that store loyalty is 
associated with higher store brand (conditional) choice probabilities.  Second, store-loyal 
households tend to be less loyal to individual brands (regardless of store brands or 
national brands).  Third, we generate mixed results, across categories, on what happens to 
retail prices when a store brand is introduced.  Overall, we find that when a store brand is 
introduced, the incumbent (national brands) prices tend to rise also.  However, this result 
does not show through when we do category level analyses.  From a category level 
analysis of what happens when a store brand enters we find that, in approximately half of 
the categories tested, incumbents’ prices increase but in the other half incumbents’ prices 
decrease. 
 
We also note that retailers’ profit margins, as a percentage of retail price ([p-wp]/p%), are 
often greater for the store brands than the national brands (see, for example, Table 5).  
We observe in our data that the share of the total sales to the loyal segment is generally 
higher than the share of sales to the switching segment.  Since store-loyal customers also 
are characterized by a higher probability of buying the store brands, this suggests that the 
retailer may be able to make more money from the store loyal customers than from the 
switchers.   
 
----------------------------- 
Table 5 here 
----------------------------- 
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This observation, coupled with the result that the entry of a store brand results in pushing 
category wide prices higher, suggests that in some of the categories, retailers may be able 
to make money on two fronts via the introduction of a store brand.  First, the (more 
profitable) store brand is bought more by loyal customers.  Second, all customers now 
pay the higher prices for the national brands.  That is, the retailer can increase the gap 
between national brands and store brands by raising prices of the former, and can make 
more money from the store loyals (due to the store brands’ higher margins coupled with 
higher purchase probability), so the retailer wins on these two fronts. 
 
In summary, the effect of including category fixed effects in the specification of the 
models, is that fit is improved dramatically, suggesting our model is better able to explain 
the variation in the retail prices.  However, it also has the effect of making the average 
impact of entry on incumbents’ prices diminish in explanatory power.  Since the “fixed 
effects” do not adequately explain the role of the category in such price changes, we 
would like to model this more directly.   That is, our results thus far beg the question: 
what category characteristics account for this variation?  In what follows, we pursue this 
issue. 
 
Category characteristics and change in prices.  We generate a number of metrics for 
category characteristics.  To the extent that these characteristics vary with the entry date, 
they capture the "interaction" between these variables and entry. We therefore included 
the "main effects" of these characteristics as additional variables in the specification. 
These main effects variables were constructed using the first 40 weeks of data.   For 
example, at the time the brand FOXES Flavored Crackers was introduced, in week 699, 
there were an average of 26.5 parent companies per week in the category, making about 
70 different brands, and the category had a Herfindahl (dollar share) index of 33%.   
 
The way we modeled the interaction-based category specific variables is to make the 
 parameter a function of these entry-date/category specific factors: ,1
nb plδ
  ,1 (#parents,#brands,Herf$,HerfVol,PLpresence,Pricedispersion)
pl nb fδ =
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We use the following metrics to describe the category (stack these into , with an 
intercept value). The number of parents is the total number of multi-brand firms, average 
per week.  The number of brands is the average number of brands available at that store 
per week.  The Herfindahl metrics (one based on dollar share the other on volume share) 
is the sum of the squared market shares, average per week.  These measure the level of 
competition present in the category.  We also use an indicator variable for the presence of 
a store brand in the category at the time the brand entered the category.  The final metric 
is the level of price dispersion, defined as the average difference between the maximum 
and minimum price per week.   
Z
 
We assume that the function  is linear additive with no random effect.  Note that we 
do not put both the Herfindahl $ and Herfindahl volume metrics into the specification.  
Instead, we only use the one with the best overall fit; this is the Herfindahl, based on 
volume. 
( )f Z
 
The results for this analysis are in reported in Table 6 ( 2R =49%, df=6,031, for store 
brand entry, and 36%, df=69,122, for national brand entry).  Across categories, the 
average Herfindahl index is 0.39, the average number of parents is 8, owning a total of 15 
brands, and the price dispersion metric is on average 3.9.  For the entry of the national 
brand, the change in the category price is affected in a positive way by the level of market 
power in the category (higher market power means more positive, or less negative impact 
in retail prices).  There is no significant impact of the number of parents or the number of 
brands.  Higher market concentration (ie. high Herfindahl or lower number of parents) 
tends to imply higher margins, and often results in higher retail prices.  As a result we 
may expect any positive impact of a store brand entry on incumbents’ retail prices to be 
dampened somewhat in such concentrated categories.  This is certainly consistent with 
our results.   
 
We include a metric for whether a store brand was present in the category when the 
national brand was introduced.  If so, then what is the impact on the change in retail 
prices?  The results (see the row labeled “SB Presence”) suggest that this impact is in the 
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same direction as the change in prices.  That is, the entry of a national brand is likely to 
augment the negative price change, on average, if there is a store brand in the category.  
----------------------------- 
Table 6 here 
----------------------------- 
 
We also used these interactions for the model where we test the effect of store brand 
entry on the category prices.  In this case, the most striking result is that the Herfindahl 
variable is opposite to that of the national brand entry.  That is, category prices are likely 
to increase less if there is greater market power when the store brand enters, than if there 
is less market power.  The level of price dispersion tends to have a negative effect on the 
price increase following a store brand entry.  That is, higher price dispersion will dampen 
the increase in category prices stemming from a store brand entry. 
 
For some categories, the entry of store brands and the consequent positive impact on 
prices may be consistent with the story that the retailers successfully position brands 
away from national brands, in order to not raise overall competition within the category.  
This is somewhat different from some recent results in the marketing literature (e.g. 
Sayman, Hoch and Raju 2002), which indicate that it is optimal to position close to the 
leading national brand.    
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The key insights generated in this paper demonstrate that the probability of purchasing a 
store brand tends to be higher for store loyal customers than for store switchers.  
Moreover, we find that store loyal customers are not necessarily brand loyal.  This latter 
finding is consistent with the observation that store-switchers can be repeatedly attracted 
by specific brands in the retailer’s assortment.  Our study also indicates that retailers do 
not systematically increase or decrease retail prices when they introduce a store into a 
category.  Instead, we find that for half the categories, retailers raise the incumbent 
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national brand prices, whereas for the other half retailers allow incumbent national brand 
prices to fall, on average.  Across the categories, we also observe that retailers alter the 
prices of larger share incumbent national brands less than the prices of smaller share 
national brands.  Finally, a category specific analysis suggests that the price change may 
be partially explained by the category level market structure – including market power 
(Herfindahl index) and the number of brands and competitors present in the category.   
 
In summary then, this paper adds to the growing literature in marketing and in economics 
on store brands. There remains a mixed understanding on how store brands make money 
for the retailer.  For example, while we observe that store brands, on average, tend to 
carry higher profits per unit to the retailer (also noted by Hoch 1996), Corstjens and Lal 
(2000) cite several industry reports that suggest store brands may not be quite as 
profitable vis-à-vis the national brands.  We have made some progress on possible means 
by which retailers may benefit via store brands, but much still needs to be done to obtain 
more insights into the topic. 
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Appendix A – Definition and Selection of New Brands 
 
New brands were identified as follows.  First, if we do not observe any sales for these 
brands, in any of the five stores, for the first 40 weeks of the observation period, then we 
consider this brand “new”.  We acknowledge that this definition of a new brand may be a 
superset of the true set of new brands, since it can include brands that are newly 
introduced to that region (Chicago, urban area), and also includes any brand extensions or 
modifications e.g. the (hypothetical) Kleenex Ultrasoft is a new brand by our definition, 
even though the brand Kleenex may already exist on the shelf.  This definition of a new 
brand also includes the same name brand introduced across different categories.  For 
example, if the brand “Super” launched one brand in toilet tissue and another in facial 
tissues category, then we count these as two separate new brands.   
 
We began with a set of 440 new brands, identified as new to all five stores.  Not all stores 
would launch each brand (e.g. the store brand would only be launched for one store), so 
this set represents a total of 1,035 new brand introductions.  We wanted to study only 
successful brands - that is, not the case the brand was launched and then removed from 
the shelf a few weeks later. This step also eliminates any “promotional” brands (this issue 
is going to be small since usually promotions are at the UPC level, not the brand level, 
e.g. a bonus pack).   In this spirit, we also dropped any of the brand introductions that did 
not see sales through to the last week in our observation series.   A total of 123 brands, or 
305 cases were dropped in this step. An additional 7 brand introductions were deleted 
(for 6 brand launches) where, due to data errors, the volume sales were zero.  This leaves 
a total of 723 store-level cases of new brand introductions, with 311 new brand 
introductions across the stores.  These were launched in a total of 73 categories.  In other 
words, for 31 categories, we observe no new brand introductions by our definitions.  
 
The top few categories with brand introductions include “All other cookies” with 20 new 
brands, Liquid Laundry detergents (13); sandwich/cream cookies (13); fruit/nut flavored 
cookies (12); corn chips (12); regular cereal (11) and flavored crackers (10).  About 19 of 
the categories witnessed only one new brand introduction across the five stores.  The 
most active store in terms of new brand introductions was 147.  The distribution across 
the stores was relatively uniform.  The two stores (both HILO, and belong to the same 
chain) with the lowest number of new brand introduction introductions had 106 brand 
introductions. There was considerable activity in the introduction of store brands in this 
sample.  A total of 58 of the cases were store brand introductions, launched into a total of 
38 categories across the stores.   
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for store brand presence and purchases across the stores.  
A total of 104 categories are available, 64 had Store Brand presence (SB). 
A $ Sales for categories with SB (64) $ Sales for all categories (104)  
Store SB sales Total Sales (I) SB Sales Total Sales (II) Share (I/II)
E1           156,690        15,661,946        156,690      16,372,469 0.957
E2           347,311        26,144,441        347,311      27,623,488 0.946
H1         1,476,369        13,296,318      1,476,369      13,987,183 0.950
H2             44,190         4,762,701          44,190        5,085,115 0.937
H3             45,313         4,915,095          45,313        5,210,607 0.943
 
B $ Sales for categories with SB $ Sales for all categories    
Store SB $ sales 
Total $ sales in 
SB categories (I)
Number of  
categories 
with SB (II) 
Total $ sales in 
all categories 
(III) 
Share 
(I/III) 
% Cats 
with SB 
(II/104) 
E1 156,690 13,050,984 38       16,372,469  0.80 0.37
E2 347,311 20,007,889 37       27,623,488  0.72 0.36
H1 1,476,369 12,920,174 57       13,987,183  0.92 0.55
H2 44,190 2,392,875 18         5,085,115  0.47 0.17
H3 45,313 3,008,955 20         5,210,607  0.58 0.19
 
C 
% SB Share 
overall 
% SB Share | 
available in 
store 
%SB Share | 
bought SB 
Store  
E1 1.1% 1.4% 87.3% 
E2 1.2% 1.7% 83.8% 
H1 11.8% 12.7% 90.2% 
H2 1.0% 2.1% 95.9% 
H3 1.3% 2.2% 99.1% 
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Table 2 Store brand probit model: results of estimation for the two store pairs. 
Variable Parameter   Est. 
2χ  
Intercept 0α  -1.4861 0.0313 2250.82 
E1 fixed effect 1Eα  -0.2442 0.0268 82.93 
E2 fixed effect 2Eα  -0.4281 0.0256 278.84 
H1 fixed effect 1Hα  0.5598 0.0233 576.5 
H2 fixed effect 2Hα  -0.0071 0.0345 0.04 
Cat share 1β  -1.3211 0.0594 494.86 
Store loyalty 2β  0.3285 0.0258 161.86 
Price 3β  -0.08 0.006 179.26 
     
Store loyalty elasticity:  0.239   
Marginal loyalty effect: 3 (1 )
sb s
hcst hcstP Pβ − b  0.032   
     
Fit Statistics:     
Df SB=1 13,962   
 SB=0 111,985   
Log Likelihood  -39,655.0   
     
Type III Analysis of effects: Wald 
2χ :   
E1 fixed effect  82.934   
E2 fixed effect  278.836   
H1 fixed effect  576.496   
H2 fixed effect  0.042   
Cat share  494.86   
Store loyalty  161.862   
Price  179.262   
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Table 3 Brand loyalty and store loyalty (partial) correlation matrix.  Estimates in 
parentheses are not statistically significant with 95% two-tail test. 
    Brand loyalty:       
Store loyalty:   E1 E2 H1 H2 H3 
E1 -0.718 0.345 0.167 0.007 0.177 
Prob > |r| <.0001 <.0001 0.0071 0.9219 0.0395 
N 226 304 259 182 135 
   
E2 0.436 -0.755 0.125 0.231 0.303 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.0439 0.0017 0.0004 
N 226 304 259 182 135 
   
H1 0.365 0.420 -0.553 0.305 0.346 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
N 226 304 259 182 135 
   
H2 0.197 0.209 0.324 -0.566 0.065 
  0.0029 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.4528 
N 226 304 259 182 135 
   
H3 0.298 0.260 0.295 0.197 -0.666 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0076 <.0001 
 N 226 304 259 182 135 
 
 
Table 4 Direct effect on average category level incumbent prices following 
introduction of new brands. 
 
Entry of:             
    Store brand   National brand 
Variable Parameter Est. s.e.  Est. s.e. 
Intercept 0α  0.32759 0.013  0.47540 0.005 
E2 2Eα  0.62532 0.032  -0.01153 0.007 
H1 1Hα  0.10193 0.017  0.05114 0.007 
H2 2Hα  0.88594 0.045  0.19492 0.008 
H3 3Hα  0.97286 0.061  0.22688 0.008 
sj
sctI
τ  1δ  0.13503 0.016  -0.03743 0.006 
[ , )j sj
sctI
τ τ  2δ  -0.07159 0.188  -0.06143 0.014 
       
2R   0.1027   0.0237  
df       6,031          69,122   
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Table 5 Average profit retail margins (= % of retail price which is profit to the retailer) 
for selected categories across all stores in the Dominick’s Finer Foods chain.  
Source: Dominick’s Finer Foods, public database, University of Chicago Kilts 
Center. 
 
  
Retail 
Margin   
Retail 
Margin 
Category name NB% SB%   NB% SB% 
Internal analgesic tablet/liquid form 6.09 43.10 Frozen apple juice concentrate 21.39 17.73
Ready to eat cereal 9.67 27.94 Frozen grape juice concentrate 27.17 34.59
Shelf stable soup 15.35 18.00 Frozen lemonade/limeade concentrate 30.79 42.17
Fine washable laundry detergent 12.08 31.98 Frozen orange juice concentrate 19.58 34.18
Liquid laundry detergent 9.87 18.49 Refrigerated fruit drink  16.94 35.04
Powder laundry detergent 7.59 12.39 Refrigerated lemonade 17.34 35.23
Paper towels 11.67 19.15 Refrigerated orange juice 20.01 27.73
Frozen side dish 10.40 17.01 Fabric softener sheets 11.43 36.81
Laundry prewash additive/stain remover 13.23 12.82 Fabric softener concentrate 10.55 33.83
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Table 6 Impact of category characteristics on price changes. 
   Entry of:        
   Parameter: Store brand National brand 
Intercept 0α  0.89848 0.051 0.14267 0.011 
E2 1Eα  0.31383 0.027 0.08380 0.006 
H1 1Ha  0.02144 0.015 0.21093 0.007 
H2 2Hα  -0.05186 0.040 0.07456 0.007 
H3 3Hα  0.52306 0.049 0.13586 0.007 
Category main effects:   
Herf vol 1β  -1.74360 0.099 0.20216 0.020 
# parents 2β  -0.08632 0.003 -0.01853 0.0007 
# brands 3β  0.01446 0.0006 0.01339 0.0002 
Price disp 4β  0.15119 0.003 0.06861 0.0008 
sj
sctI
τ  10δ  0.50195 0.085 -0.14334 0.021 
Category interaction effects:  
Herf vol 11δ  -0.66967 0.164 0.22417 0.0340 
# parents 12δ  0.00743 0.006 -0.00014 0.001 
# brands 13δ  -0.00719 0.001 0.00061 0.0004 
Price disp 14δ  -0.01841 0.005 0.00182 0.001 
   
[ , )j sj
sctI
τ τ  2δ  -0.54850 0.1456 -0.01241 0.011 
SB presence    -0.38709 0.005 
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Figure 1  Store brand expenditure shares by households across all stores. 
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Figure 2  Changes in category level prices for store brand versus national brand.  The 
horizontal access is the rank order for the categories.  The vertical access 
displays the percentage change in the respective category prices given either a 
store or a national brand entry.  The top panel presents data for the store brand 
entry; the bottom panel is for the national brand entry. 
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  Category name, ranking (lowest is most negative)     
Category name NB SB Category name NB SB Category name NB SB 
Breakfast sausage 3 1 Steak sauce  26 Liquid laundry detergents 9  
Low calorie cola 26 2 Presweetened cereals 55 27 Liquid soaps 37  
Assorted cookies 7 3 Paper towels 45 28 Low calorie club soda 43  
Cola softdrinks 22 4 Regular cereal 49 29 Matzo/kosher crackers 1  
Internal analgesic caplets 65 5 Icecream 54 30 Meat gravy sauces 53  
Peanut butter spread  6 Puffed cheese snacks 56 31 Miscellaneous Mexican sauces 8  
Frozen pizza 12 7 Hot sauces 47 32 Mixed snackfoods 17  
Granulated sugar  8 Graham crackers 48 33 Mixed soda drinks 24  
Butter spread  9 Hot dogs - pork based 63 34 Other soft drinks 64  
Flavored soda drinks 34 10 Bar soaps 58  Pasta sauce 31  
Tartar sauces  11 Barbeque sauce 6  Pizza dough and crusts 44  
Chip filled cookies 25 12 Bathroom tissue 23  Pizza sauce 30  
All other cookies 41 13 Brown sugar 29  Pork rinds 5  
Corn chips 38 14 Bulk frozen yogurt 59  Potato stick snacks 35  
Potato chips 32 15 Canned wet catfood 36  Pretzel crackers 18  
Yogurt 40 16 Chocolate covered cookies 50  Pretzels 19  
Low calorie flavored soda 13 17 Diet cookies 62  Salsa sauces 39  
Oyster crackers  18 Diet icecream 15  Sloppy joe sauce 11  
Fruit and nut flavored cookies 52 19 Hotdogs - frankfurters 42  Smoked sausage 10  
Picante sauces 14 20 Dry catfood 20  Specialty sausage 21  
Sandwich/cream cookies 27 21 Eggs 57  Toasted crackers 61  
Margarine spread 16 22 Flavored crackers 33  Toothpaste 46  
Oriental sauces  23 Grain snacks 2  Variety snack packs 28  
Powdered laundry detergents 51 24 Ground coffee 4     
Soda crackers  25 Italian sauces 60     
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